miércoles, abril 26

The True Islam

When will people realize, the foundations of Islam are built upon violence, war, and conquest? That their founder, The Prophet, led the way in jihad, living a life that was based around warfare?

This is the is Islam that we deal with. Even right here in the heart of America:

"The mushroom cloud is on the way!" they yell in Arabic in the middle of NEW YORK CITY!

There is no peaceful Islam. Anyone who says so has not truthfully read the Qu'ran or the Hadiths, nor studied Muhammad's life.

And this quote?
“The Jews and Christians will never be pleased with you until you follow their religion [or ideology].”

Now come on. That's funny.

Ah, the irony!

lunes, abril 24

Oakshott on Hobbes, Language, and Philosophy

For a while now, I've been intrigued by the implications of language. I've been fascinated by the idea of how language shapes one's thoughts - the idea of thinking in your language and how the implications of one's specific first language affects his thoughts. Prime example, a Native American tribe in the southwest has a language in which the past tense DOES NOT exist. How does this affect their mental thoughts? Their world view? I can't fathom it. Or a native speaker whose language has 5 different words for "love." Or one whose native language has two different past tenses. And what about a baby that is nursed and brought up never being spoken to, never hearing speach. Is even possible to mentally mature in that context? I don't see how it would be possible. How could they form thoughts without having any sort of language to form those thoughts around. What a fascinating concept. Anyway, Oakshott touched on that, and I found it really fascinating:

Our task now is to follow Hobbes in his account of the generation of rational knowledge from experience. In principle, experience (except perhaps when it issues in history) is something man shares with animals and has only in a greater degree: memory and imagination are the unsought mechanical products of sensation, like movements that continue on the surface of water after what disturbed it has sunk to rest. In order to surmount the limits of this sense-experience and achieve reasoned knowledge of our sensations, we require not only to have sensations, but to be consious of having them; we require the power of introspection. But the cause of this power must lie in sense itself, if the power is to avoid the imputation of being an easy deus ex machina. Language satisfies both these conditions: it makes introspection possible, and springs from a power we share with animals, the physical power of making sounds. For, though langauge 'when disposed of in speech and pronounced to others' is the means whereby men declare their thoughts to one another, it is primarily the only means by which a man may communicate his own thoughts to himself, may become conscious of the contents of his mind. The beginning of language is giving names to after-images of sensations and thereby becoming conscious of them; the act of naming the image is the act of becoming conscious of it. For, 'a name is a word taken at pleasure to serve as a mark that may raise in our minds a thought like some thought we had before'.

Language, the giving of names to images, is not itself reasonable, it is the arbitary precondition of all reasoning: the generation of rational knowledge is by words out of experience. The achievement of language is to 'register our thoughts', to fix what is essentially fleeting. And from this achievement follows the possibility of definition, the conjunction of general names, proposition and rational argument, all of which consist in the 'proper use of names in language'. But, though reasoning brings with it knowledge of the general and the possibility of truth and its opposite, absurdity, it can never pass beyond the world of names. Reasoning is nothing else but the addition and subtraction of names, and 'gives us conlusions, not about the nature of things, but about the names of things. That is to say, by means of reason we discover only whether the connections we have established between names are in accordance with the arbitrary convention we have established concerning their meanings'. This is at once a nominalist and a profoundly sceptical doctrine. Truth is of universals, but they are names, the names of images left over from sensations; and a true proposition is not an assertion about the real world. We can, then, surmount the limits of sense-experience and achieve rational knowledge; and it is this knowledge, with its own severe limitation, that is the concern of philosophy.